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Abstract
We reveal the non-separation of ownership and control for multiple blockholders
in the French insider governance system. We show that overlapping directorships of
large listed corporations are explained by their ownership connections. Both large
and small stakes, from 20% to 1% of cash-flow rights or voting rights, have high
explanatory power. Some shareholdings are control rather than monitoring related.
We provide evidence also that cross-ownership allows CEOs to entrench themselves.
Finally, we demonstrate that causality goes from ownership to interlocking direc-
torates, for both unilateral stakes and cross-shareholdings.
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1 Introduction
In most countries, 10% to 20% of the voting rights in a typical listed company are held by
the main shareholder (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov,
and Lang, 2000; Barca and Becht, 2001; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Laeven and Levine,
2008; Holderness, 2009; Carney and Child, 2013). This leading owner “controls” (in the
understanding in Berle and Means, 1932, Hart, 1995 and Tirole, 2006) the corporation:
based on her majority at general meetings due to the confidence or passivity of the other
minority shareholders, she can select the directors who then vote for the CEO. The CEO,
therefore, can be assumed to represent the main shareholder. Nevertheless, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999, p. 496) acknowledge that, among the largest firms
the percentage of equity needed to actually control them is lower than the conventional
threshold of 20% or 10% of cash-flow rights (CFR) or voting rights (VR). For this reason,
some authors (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Barca and Becht, 2001) refer to blockholders
with at least 5% shareholdings. According to Zwiebel (1995) a threshold of 1% is already
important because it allows small blockholders to be part of a controlling coalition and
to share the partial benefits of control. Thus, although blockholders do not have formal
control, i.e. more than 50% of the VR, they can obtain real control, i.e. more than
50% of the votes (Tirole, 2006). Therefore, exploring to what extent a multiplicity of
minority shareholdings conveys decision-making authority to its respective holders is a
crucial question to understand how corporations are controlled by their owners.
The aim of this paper is to assess whether there is separation of ownership and control
not only for the largest blockholders but also for multiple small owners of a company. In
accordance with control rights theories (Tirole, 2006; Gibbons, 2005; Hart, 1995), the rela-
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tion between ownership and control is understood as a relation between ownership and the
acquisition of decision rights, i.e., an ability to affect the course of action of a firm through
membership of the board of directors.1 In this respect, our main empirical contribution
is to show that separation between ownership and control does not exist even for a large
range of small shareholders. We contribute to knowledge on the role of shareholders in
the selection of directors, in a context where a better understanding is required, especially
in the context of non-Anglo-American firms (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010).
Few studies focus on this specific relationship,2 while its relevance is suggested by some
stylized facts. For instance, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Claessens,
Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) illustrate the non-separation be-
tween ownership and control, showing that when the controlling shareholder is a family,
then, in at least 60% of the cases they studied, the chairman of the board or the CEO
is part of this family.3 Regarding these univariate statistics our contribution is threefold.
(i) We extend these results by considering ownership between corporations on the one
hand, and by considering all members of boards of directors on the other. Companies
can be important shareholders in insider governance systems which prevail in developed
countries such as Japan, Germany and France. We focus on the entire board because
even if directors are separated from management they have a say in CEO selection and
all other board decisions. (ii) We do not use an ad hoc legal criterion of CFR or VR to
1Note that control rights are defined as an exit right in Hart’s (1995) framework (Hart and Holmström,
2010), whereas they are defined as a right to interfere in management choices in Aghion and Bolton (1992)
or Tirole’s (2006) models.
2E.g., Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) study shareholder behavior during director elections in US
corporations.
3In another worldwide sample (Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell, 2008), 47% of the directors are
affiliated to the dominant shareholder but only 9% of the board members belong to the dominant share-
holder’s family. See also Yeh and Woidtke (2005) who find that such a relationship occurs for half of
their sample of Taiwanese firms. Carney and Child (2013) extend Claessens, Djankov, and Lang’s (2000)
study and show that, in 2008, ownership is not separated from management in 70% of East Asian firms
controlled by family shareholders.
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postulate control. Rather, we test a range of thresholds from 1% to 20%, that allow a
shareholder to obtain a seat on the board, and thereby to take part in board decisions.
(iii) By analyzing various thresholds, we are able to consider control rights obtained by
multiple shareowners of a corporation and not only by the first or the second one. Let us
examine these three points to present our methodological contribution before reviewing
the literature and formulating our empirical propositions.
First, we want to assess whether the non-separation of ownership and control applies
to various types of shareholders or only for the largest ones. Therefore, we need to de-
termine the strength of the correlation between ownership structure and board structure.
The main difficulty is to identify whose interests are represented by the members of the
board of directors. The methodology we propose is in two steps: we first consider that
public companies use their directors as delegates to other companies’ boards. Hence,
overlapping directorates reflect controlling or monitoring ties between corporations, and
we can focus on their correlation with ownership connections among the same set of com-
panies to assess the relationship between ownership and control for a large number of
shareholders. This requires estimating the correlation between two networks: a set of
shareholding ties among listed companies and the web of overlapping directors of these
same corporations. More precisely, we build a corporate-pair dataset that allows us to
analyze the various connections of components of a dyad (i.e. a pair of companies) with
all the other companies in the sample. This dyadic framework4 is appropriate to explore
multiple capital thresholds reflecting a large range of shareholdings. Indeed, this method
has the great advantage of allowing estimation of the correlation between ownership con-
4Financial studies (e.g. Khanna and Thomas, 2009; Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider, 2010) and soci-
ological studies (e.g. Mizruchi, 1992) use this dyadic framework to examine networks of firms.
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nections and board ties for a multiplicity of blockholders. To our knowledge, this study
is the first to evaluate the relationship between these financial and human networks.
This approach is particularly relevant for insider governance systems5 distinguished
by the existence of multiple blockholdings by other financial and non-financial companies
(see e.g. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, and Franks and Mayer, 2001, for Germany, and
Franks, Mayer, and Miyajima, 2012, for Japan). We collect data from several sources
to obtain reliable information on board structures and ultimate ownership structures of
large French corporations. The rationale for using French data is the complexity and the
density of the web of shareholdings among French corporations as a result of the waves
of privatization that occurred since the 1980s. The declining government ownership in
the main French companies was replaced in the 1990s by multiple core shareholdings
between corporations (the so-called noyaux durs, Morin, 2000). Therefore, we can use
these specific French connections to measure the correlation between multiple ownership
ties and overlapping directors among firms. Like other shareowners, corporations vote for
directors based on their voting rights. Our focus on ownership among French companies
is an illustration of the general voting power associated with shareholding. Similar tests
should be conducted on other countries with insider governance systems such as Germany
and Japan where ownership networks are well-known,6 or in other financial markets where
5In an insider governance system, management and board decisions are controlled by blockholders,
while in an outsider governance system market discipline is carried out by outside shareholders through
hostile takeovers (see Franks and Mayer, 1990, 1997, 2001; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001; Bebchuk
and Weisbach, 2010). In other words, according to Tirole (2006), management choices are actively
monitored by incumbents in insider systems and by entrants in outsider systems. Moreover, family and
corporate blockholders enjoy both the public and private benefits of control in insider systems while
outside shareholders derive benefits only in the form of financial returns (Franks, Mayer, and Miyajima,
2012).
6See e.g. Franks and Mayer (1997, 2001), Morin (2000) and Goergen, Manjon, and Renneboog (2008)
for France and Germany, and Aoki (1988), Berglöf and Perotti (1994), Morck and Nakamura (1999), Aoki,
Jackson, and Miyajima (2007) and Franks, Mayer, and Miyajima (2012) for Japan. See also references
related to German governance below in the text.
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business groups are widespread.7 However, France offers the conditions of this “natural
experiment” and its ownership networks are rarely studied (Morin, 2000) although French
corporate governance has been the subject of an increasing number of studies in the
financial literature.8
Next, to consider the multiplicity of shareholdings we collect data on all shareholders
for whom we can find information. In our study, the smallest shareowner holds 0.2%
of the CFR of a corporation. This allows us to consider a large range of VR and CFR
thresholds, from 1% to the generally accepted 20%. The motivations for studying this
cut-off range are the effect of market capitalization on the size of shareholdings on the
one hand, and the potential existence of controlling coalitions on the other. Sullivan
and Spong (2007) underline that the share of a holding in the portfolio of its owner is
a more reliable figure than the percentage of her stake in the ownership structure of the
owned firm.9 Certainly, it reveals the shareowner’s true incentives to monitor or control
the corporation. This underlines the importance of analyzing multiple thresholds because
stakes in large capitalizations – such as the ones of our sample – probably have more
weight than stakes in small capitalizations in the portfolios of their holders. Moreover, a
small percentage ownership in a company can be influential because the owner contributes
to achieving a majority in the election of directors by a coalition of small shareholders.
Finally, in analyzing this range of thresholds this work contributes to the literature
on controlling minority shareholders (see Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010), and complex
7See e.g. Khanna and Yafeh (2007) and Almeida, Park, Subrahmanyam, and Wolfenzon (2011) for
developing countries and Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011) for a worldwide study.
8For other references on French corporate governance, see Chikh and Filbien (2011), Ginglinger, Meg-
ginson, and Waxin (2011), Kramarz and Thesmar (2006), Murphy (2005), Bloch and Kremp (2001), and
Franks and Mayer (1997, 1990).
9Unfortunately, these kinds of figures are neither available nor exhaustively reconstitutable for the
corporations in our sample.
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ownership structures and multiple large shareholders (MLS).10 In particular, we consider
owners even if they are not in first or second place in the ownership structure or above the
classical threshold of 5% of VR. Whatever the size of a shareholder’s stake, it may elect
one or more seats on the board by contributing to a shareholder coalition. According to
the MLS literature, the motivations are various: multiple shareholders may develop an
alliance to collude and share the private benefits of control or they may wish to monitor
the incumbent controlling owner (Pagano and Röell, 1998; Zwiebel, 1995). In our study,
we show that some large and small shareholdings are held with the aim of control rather
than for monitoring purposes.
This paper is connected with two other strands of the financial literature. The first
focuses on the relationship between ownership and board structures, especially among
financial and non-financial companies; the second is related to interlocking directorates.
First, our work is related to studies examining the relationships between ownership and
board structure. This issue is addressed in Denis and Sarin (1999), Mak and Li (2001)
and Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian (2002) which show that the proportion of outside
board members increases with managerial ownership dispersion in US and Singaporean
companies. These correlations are based on aggregate measures of ownership and board
structures. However, these aggregations can hide a diversity of interests in managerial
ownership – as argued by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and in outside directors – as
shown by many authors (e.g. Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Bradbury and Mak, 2000;
Singh and Davidson III, 2003; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Fracassi and Tate, 2012). In this
10For analytical works see Zwiebel (1995), Pagano and Röell (1998), Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis
(2000), Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000), Bloch and Hege (2001), Gomes and Novaes (2005), Dhillon and
Rossetto (2009), Edmans and Manso (2011). For empirical evidence see e.g. Maury and Pajuste (2005),
Laeven and Levine (2008), Attig, Guedhami, and Mishra (2008) and Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and
Rizeanu (2013).
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paper, we provide evidence on the correlation between ownership and board structure
on a dyadic not an aggregate basis. This allows us to control in our estimates for the
characteristics of the owner and of the corporation in which she has a shareholding.
Some studies of ownership and board structure focus on management turnover. For
instance, Kaplan and Minton (1994) show that in poorly managed Japanese firms cor-
porate shareholders appoint representatives before a top executive change. Köke (2004)
finds that, in German firms, management turnover increases after a change in ultimate
control, whatever their past performance.11 This evidence suggests that the causality
between ownership and control goes from the former to the latter. However, it would
seem logical that control ties cause ownership connections because interlocked directors
encourage shareholdings between the two firms concerned. We take advantage of the panel
structure of our data to address this causality issue.
Our focus on ownership and directorship ties among corporations is also related to
studies on this relationship occurring between financial and non-financial companies. Ed-
wards and Nibler (2000) and Gorton and Schmid (2000) demonstrate that the board
structure of German firms is affected by bank shareholdings or by their voting power be-
cause they are able to appoint their representatives. Similarly, Franks and Mayer (2001)
illustrate the representation of bankers on the boards of firms in which they hold shares or
proxy votes while Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2010) show that in 2000-2005 the sale
by a German bank of its holding in a corporation was associated with the removal of its
representative from the firm’s board. Morck and Nakamura (1999) also provide evidence
on this ownership-board structure relationship, among banks and firms in Japan. Even
11However, the evidence is mixed for Germany. Using other samples, Kaplan (1994) and Franks and
Mayer (2001) find that management turnover follows low performance but is not affected by ownership
structure. However, Franks and Mayer (2001) also show that corporations ultimately controlled by banks
exhibit higher turnover in the case of low performance.
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in the US, banks are represented in firms in which they have voting power thanks to their
fiduciary activities (Santos and Rumble, 2006). While financial studies tend to focus on
the ownership-board link between banks and firms, there is no available evidence on this
relationship when it involves other financial firms such as insurance companies, or when
it occurs among non-financial corporations which are also typical shareholders in insider
governance systems. Our contribution evaluates the intensity of this ownership-board cor-
relation considering all possible relationships between banks, insurance companies, and
non-financial companies.
Finally, our work adds to the interlocking directorate literature. A directorate interlock
is created between two firms when a director of one of them is also on the board of the
other firm: this is the board relationship we explain in this paper. Overlapping directors
among corporations have been receiving increased attention in financial studies, alongside
consideration of networks in economics (Jackson, 2008). Stuart and Yim (2010) and Chikh
and Filbien (2011) show that interlocking directorates facilitate M&A activities. Cai and
Sevilir (2012) find that they explain the positive returns to the acquirer. Interlocks also
contribute to diffusing board structure characteristics (Bouwman, 2011) or stock option
backdating practices (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby, 2009). Hwang and Kim (2009), Fich
and White (2005) and Hallock (1997) study the effects of interlocks between CEOs, or
between CEOs and directors on CEO pay. Robinson and Stuart (2007) and Lindsey (2008)
assess the impact of director networks and equity networks on strategic alliances. However,
while ownership connections are potential determinants of interlocking directorates, there
are no financial studies on this issue. Khanna and Thomas (2009) and Ferreira and Matos
(2012) analyze both interlock and ownership ties, respectively between corporations and
between banks and firms, to assess their effect on stock price synchronization or on loan
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rates, but do not address the causality issue between equity and personal linkages. Our
work aims to fill this gap. A paper in the sociology literature by Bohman (2012) assesses
the probability that two firms are interlocked if they have a common shareholder. Our
study acknowledges and controls for this effect: when two firms have the same owner, then
this owner is likely to appoint the same director to both firms. However, the shareholder
can choose different representatives from his own board. Therefore, we can expect that
the probability of being interlocked for two companies will be lower if they have a common
shareholder than if one of these companies has an equity tie with the other. We find that
interlocking directorates are better explained by ownership ties between two corporations
than by the number of common shareholders in these two companies.
The above, and questions related to the diversity of control thresholds and the multi-
plicity of shareholdings among corporations suggest testing the following propositions.
PROPOSITION 1: the most influential determinants of the formation of interlocking
directorates are ownership linkages because unique or multiple shareowners are able to
influence board selection and appoint directors who will act on their behalf either to
control board decisions or to monitor managers and other directors. This means that
shareowners principally choose board members because they will represent their interests,
and that ownership is not separated from control if it is assumed that directors are able
to affect the course of action of a corporation.
Consequently: i) frequency of interlocking directorates should be more strongly corre-
lated with ownership linkages than with any other factor such as directors’ skills, board
size, ownership concentration, and so on; ii) even ownership linkages generated by small
shareholdings could produce interlocking directorates either because the market capital-
ization is large or because the owner’s stake is part of a shareholders coalition; iii) the
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higher the shareholdings between two firms, the higher will be the odds of having at least
one interlocking directorate between the owner firm and the owned firm.
It could be argue that a correlation between small ownership ties and overlapping
directors is not enough to reflect the reality of control since we do not know whether this
small shareholding actually belongs to a coalition of controlling interests. Moreover, a
lone voice is not sufficient to control board decisions and influence corporate behavior.
Hence, we have to define a criterion for inferring control. We rely upon analytical research
(Tirole, 2006) that makes a clear distinction between monitoring and control objectives
of shareholders: monitoring is an information gathering activity, control is a decision-
making authority. Disentangling these two features is straightforward since buying shares
in order to influence board composition is costly whereas a single director is enough to
gather the information required for monitoring purposes. Therefore, multiple interlocks
are a signal that at least one of the two connected firms seeks decision-making authority
rather than simple monitoring ability. Furthermore, control enhancing mechanisms such
as cross-ownership should indicate that shareholders seek to lock-in the ownership and
board structures. This would be additional evidence of the controlling aim behind multiple
interlocks if they are associated with ownership lock-in devices.
PROPOSITION 2: i) Some shareowners are not satisfied by simple monitoring power;
they want control power. ii) This power relies more strongly on ownership linkages than
monitoring power. iii) This power depends more strongly on ownership lock-in devices
than on unilateral ownership linkages.
Since multiple interlocking directorates reveal that some firms seek control rather
than simple monitoring, the frequency of multiple board interlocks will be significantly
correlated with ownership linkages if (i) is true, and will be more strongly correlated
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to ownership linkages than the frequency of single interlocks if (ii) is true. Moreover,
unilateral stakes and cross-shareholdings between corporations should increase the odds
of having multiple interlocking directorates, with the latter effect being greater than the
former if (iii) is true.
Lastly, we check three potential shortcomings of the testable empirical consequences
of our propositions. First, we need to address the causality issue between ownership
ties and directors’ connections. Indeed, a corporation’s board members can suggest to
other firms where they are directors, to take a stake in one of these companies. This
leads to a second potential caveat which we have to check for, i.e. our results might be
driven by the CEOs’ striving for entrenchment. Interlocking directorates could be a means
for managers to insulate themselves from shareholder pressure by diverting corporations’
assets into shareholdings in other companies. Third, the network of direct ownership
linkages across companies may not capture the interests obscured by pyramidal ownership
structures which produce indirect ownership ties among corporations. All these issues
require adequate robustness tests.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents the sample
construction, data and empirical issues to be tested. Section 3 describes the econometric
method and the main results. Section 4 focuses on robustness tests. Section 5 concludes
and highlights some regulatory implications of this study.
2 Data and empirical testing issues
To test Proposition 1, we need to assess the correlation between ownership linkages and
board connections after controlling for other possible determinants of interlocking direc-
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torates. Shareowners may develop strategies aimed at acquiring control power, i.e. they
may seek to influence the composition of the board in order to determine manager selection
and to influence their subsequent conduct. Consequently, we need to examine whether
ownership linkages allow more than simple monitoring of firms’ managers (Proposition
2).
Although it is difficult to obtain direct and reliable information on the interests that
board members represent, their identities and some of their characteristics are public in-
formation. We can determine whether they belong to several directorates which would
create human linkages between firms whose boards are de facto interconnected by direc-
tors’ multiple attendances. The main hypothesis here is that, if some firms seek to obtain
monitoring or control power over some other firms, they will try to get their own directors
nominated to the boards of targeted firms. Of course, we do not expect perfect correlation
because a shareowner seeking to obtain control over a firm can propose a director that is
not already a member of his own firm’s board: interlocking directorates give monitoring
and control power but these can be obtained in other ways than interlocking directorates.
However, there is good empirical evidence to support the idea that corporations send
directors to other firms in order to influence the corporate governance standards of these
companies (see, e.g., Bouwman, 2011).
2.1 Sample construction
The central empirical issue here is to assess the correlation between two kinds of networks:
the network created by interlocking directorates and the network formed by companies’
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ownership linkages. Constructing these networks is therefore the starting point of the
sampling approach.
Since gathering reliable information on board composition and ownership linkages
requires manually compiling annual reports, there is a limit to the number of firms that
can be included in a panel dataset that spans a sufficiently long time period. Moreover,
part of the information we need is available only for listed companies; in particular the
publication of board structure is not mandatory for non-listed companies. Therefore,
we cannot observe the entire network of firms’ interlocking directorates, and as is usual
in structural network analysis, we focus on a relevant sub-network. We selected French
companies in the CAC 40, the main Paris Stock Exchange index, which means that our
results may be representative only of large listed corporations.12 However, investigating
to what extent multiple small stakes can give monitoring or control power to their owner
is particularly relevant for large firms since the incentives to influence their governance
increase with market capitalization. The 40 CAC 40 firms are selected, every quarter, from
among the 100 most traded firms on the Euronext Paris stock exchange. The selection
criterion is capitalization provided that shares are liquid enough. Of course, there are
entries and exits from the CAC 40 index over the observation period (1997-2006): the
sample is composed of 61 companies that were listed in the CAC 40 for at least one
quarter between 1997 and 2006 (Table 1). The CAC 40 index is representative of the
industry sectors in the SBF 250 index, which is also constructed to be representative of
the Paris stock market.13
12However, the number of missing nodes and links in this CAC 40 sub-network is likely to be small:
super large companies do not share directors with small firms; and small companies cannot afford to
purchase large shareholdings in the massive capitalizations composing the CAC 40. Our econometric
results show also that there is a significant homophily effect in the CAC 40 network of interlocking
directorates, which shows that CAC 40 firms tend to connect themselves with similar firms.
13Representativity tests are available upon request. We implemented them year by year and for 4
sectoral categories in order to have a minimum of 5 observations by year and by category. The sectoral
14
Please insert Table 1
The resulting number of firm-years observations is 507. However, because the depen-
dent variable is the probability of having one or more interlocking directors between any
possible pair of firms in this sample, the regressions are implemented over all possible
dyads between the 61 firms. The 61 firms provide 1,830 dyads (= 61× 60/2) but 20 firms
are not listed over the entire 1997-2006 period, either because they entered the French
stock exchange after 1997 or because they were delisted before 2006 (Table 1). We there-
fore implement our regressions on an unbalanced panel of 1,776 undirected firm pairs (or
dyads), with 12,611 dyad-year observations (Table 1, and Table 2 Panel B).
Please insert Table 2
2.2 Dependent and independent variables
2.2.1 The dependent variable
As already explained, we consider that interlocking directorates are a good measure of
the monitoring or control that some companies can exert on the governance of other
companies. It is impossible to measure directly whose interests a director represents, but it
can be assumed that if appointed to the boards of two or more companies, this director will
have to consider the interests of each one when exerting her power in another. We therefore
construct a count variable equal to the number of interlocks between each firm dyad, and
transform it into the dummies presented in Table 3: DU_INTERLOCK1=1 when the
dyad has one single interlock, and DU_INTERLOCK_MIN2=1 when the dyad has at
categories are aggregated according to the following 1-digit SIC industrial sectors i) A, B, C, and D
(Agriculture, Mining, Construction and Manufacturing); ii) F and G (Wholesale and Retail Trade); iii)
E and I (Transportation, Communications, Utilities, and Services; iv) H (Finance, Insurance).
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least two interlocks; the categorical variable INTERLOCKS ranges from 0 to 2 and is equal
to 1 if DU_INTERLOCK1=1 and is equal to 2 if DU_INTERLOCK_MIN2=1. Table
2 panel B, describes the evolution of overlapping directors over the period under study.
The information on board composition comes from firms’ annual reports and financial
newspapers and is provided by the Dafsaliens database. Board composition of Dafsalien
is as of 31 December each year. We systematically checked and where necessary corrected,
the information on whether the board chairman was also the firm’s CEO. Separation of
these two functions is growing over the period in this sample, so we need to control for this
in the regressions. Board identification is obvious for the one-tier board systems prevailing
in most incorporated companies since in this case there is only one board. However,
some incorporated companies in the sample have a two-tier board system comprising a
supervisory board and an executive board, and there are also two companies that are
partnerships limited by shares (“Sociétés en commandite par actions”) with supervisory
boards and one or several managing partners.14 For the former companies we consider only
the interlocks involving the supervisory board because the executive board is nominated
by the supervisory board which is chosen by the shareholders. For the latter, we consider
the interlocks involving both the supervisory board and the managing partners.
Please insert Table 3
14More detailed statistics on the distribution in the dataset of types of companies and board sizes are
available on request. The share of two-tier board systems is diminishing from 2003, and the share of
companies with separation of board chairman and CEO is growing constantly from 2000. Note also that
board size depends on corporate governance laws, and that the NRE law of 2001 obliged French companies
to limit the number of board members to 18 within 3 years. This law also reduced the maximum number
of a director’s simultaneous board memberships, from 8 to 5.
16
2.2.2 Independent variables
The main independent variables are measures of ownership linkages. Several types of
shareholding relationships between CAC 40 companies can generate interlocking direc-
torates between them. We can expect that interlocking directorates between a pair of
companies will be more probable if: i) one firm in the dyad holds shares in the other firm;
ii) there are cross-shareholdings between the firms forming the dyad; iii) a third share-
holder (another listed firm or a private owner) holds shares in the two firms of the dyad.
In any of these cases, a firm might wish to ‘send’ a director to other firms – consequently
creating a board interlock – in order to monitor, influence, or even control their strategic
choices. Two databases provide CFR for French firms: Thomson One Banker Ownership
(TOBO) and Dafsaliens. Dafsaliens also identifies parent companies and business group
subsidiaries, which are required to track firms’ ultimate owners for each direct sharehold-
ing.15 We checked the archives of financial newspapers and the information provided on
the web site of the French Authority of Financial Markets (AMF: “Autorité des Marchés
Financiers”) regarding notification of major holdings. When the holding percentage of a
particular shareowner differed across sources, we corrected aberrant numbers. We also ob-
tained information on ownership from annual reports in order to check other data sources
but also to collect VR figures, which are not reported in TOBO or Dafsaliens.16 Where
CFR were available in these two databases but not displayed in annual reports, we as-
15Tracking ultimate owners improves perception of the actual ownership network characterizing the
firms in our sample: some CAC 40 firms have no direct ownership linkages but do have indirect ownership
ties when we consider the pyramidal chain of their multiple ultimate owners. However, because the
ownership linkages matrix has to be of the same size as the interlocking directorate matrix, we can only
use information about ultimate owners belonging to the CAC 40. Finally, we show that using or not
using the ultimate owner methodology to compute cash-flow rights does not markedly change the results.
16Note also that, because of the 2006 European “transparency” directive, some VR figures are expressed
as a percentage of total equity even if some of the shares were deprived of VR because, e.g. they were
held by the actual company. In such cases, we recalculated VR on the basis of total outstanding shares.
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sumed that CFR equated with VR.17 All regressions presented include ownership linkages
computed from CFR; the results were unchanged when we use VR instead of CFR.
The resulting ownership dummy variables are presented in Table 3. We can mea-
sure the three types of ownership linkages i), ii) and iii) referred to above. For example,
DU_UNIL_CFR1 is equal to 1 if one of the two firms in the dyad holds a direct share
of the stock capital of the other firm; DU_CROSS_CFR118 is equal to 1 if each firm in
the dyad holds a share of the other firm’s CFR; IDEMOWNER is equal to the number
of common private-sector shareholders in the dyad, and DU_STATE is equal to 1 if the
French State holds shares in both companies in the dyad. It is important to control for
the French State’s shareholdings which apply to CAC 40 corporations despite the waves
of privatization in the 1990s that led to blockholdings by other companies. Similarly, we
constructed the variable DU_UNIL_VR which is equal to 1 if one of the two firms in
the dyad holds a direct share of the VR of the other firm, DU_UNIL_CFR2 which is
equal to 1 if one of the two firms in the dyad directly or indirectly holds a share of the
CFR of the other firm, and so on. Finally, we split unilateral ownership ties to consider
multiple VR or CFR cut-offs. For instance, the variables DU_UNIL_SUPα_CFR1 and
DU_UNIL_INFα_CFR1 refer to the existence of an ownership tie when it brings respec-
tively more than α% of the CFR and less than α% of the CFR, where α can take the value
of 20, 10, 5, 4, 3, 2 or 1. Table 2 panel B, presents the evolution of DU_UNIL_CFR1
and DU_CROSS_CFR1. We identify 560 unilateral ownership ties among corporations,
17This assumption is in line with Faccio and Lang’s (2002) study which shows that, in 1996, 19.96% of
stock capital was required to obtain a 20% of VR in French corporations. Nevertheless, as computed for
companies of our sample, the first shareowner is required to hold an average of 17.89% of CFR to obtain
20% of VR during the sample period. Under French corporate law, double voting is given to each share
belonging to the same shareholder for at least 2 years. General meetings can increase this duration.
18Under French corporate law no shareholding involved in cross-ownership can exceed 10% of CFR but
it can exceed 10% of VR due to double voting, which however is very rare in our sample (2 cases).
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and 63 cases of cross-ownership. As for interlocking directorates, the frequency of these
two variables is decreasing over the study period.
We also construct control variables for the other possible determinants of interlocking
directorates usually considered in the literature. Interlocks can exist for various social
and economic reasons. First, in the economic literature, board reputation and directors’
expertise are considered important sources of interlocks (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Shiv-
dasani, 1993; Yermack, 2004; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Bugeja, Rosa, and Lee, 2009;
Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010): on the demand side of the director labor market,
skilled directors are sought-after by managers and shareholders for the supplementary
value brought by their expertise; on the offer side, successful directors obtain supple-
mentary directorships in other firms, which implies better compensation and creates an
incentive to continue to be efficient. All these factors imply that firms whose board mem-
bers are particularly renowned for their excellence will exhibit more directorate interlocks
than average. To account for this determinant of interlocks, we create two variables for
each dyad at time t: DEGREEit is the number of outside directorships held by firm i’s
directors in other firms in the sample, and DEGREEjt is the number of outside direc-
torships held by firm j’s directors in other firms in the sample. Note that DEGREEit is
simply the total number of firm i’s interlocks with all the other firms in the sample, and
correspondingly for DEGREEjt. These two variables are proxies for the reputation of the
board of each firm in the dyad ij. Since the total number of a firm’s interlocks has a greater
probability to be important when board size is large, we need to introduce a measure of
board size to filter the reputation effect measured by DEGREEit and DEGREEjt. We
therefore introduce the variable BOARDSIZE which is equal to the sum of the board sizes
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of both firms in the dyad.19 In addition, it can be expected that board members of CAC
40 firms possess special expertise on this kind of very large listed firm. They may hold
valuable tacit knowledge about the strategies necessary to continue to be ranked in top
capitalizations. This implies that the same small group of persons composes the talent
pool for large capitalizations’ boards. If similar persons are always appointed to similar
firms/boards, there is likely to be a homophily effect on interlocking directorates: firms
that belong to the very selective club of CAC 40 firms tend to use the same talent pool
to select their directors, and this professional elite will tend to prefer CAC 40 firms (see,
e.g. Mace, 1971; Mizruchi, 1996; Burris, 2005). We assess this homophily effect with the
dyadic variable DISTANCETOCAC equal to the absolute value of the difference between
the number of years that firm i has been in the CAC 40 over the sampling period, minus
the number of years that firm j was in the CAC 40 over the sampling period.20 A high
DISTANCETOCAC means low degree of homophily, and this variable therefore should
have a negative impact on the probability that boards i and j are interlocked.
Another important rationale for interlocking directorates is cost-benefit optimization
along various dimensions. Firms have to get access to resources and markets at the lowest
costs, and they also have to reduce transaction and information costs as often as possible.
Several studies show that sharing directors with suppliers and customers reduces these
costs (see, e.g., Booth and Deli, 1996; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Hillman, Cannella, and
Paetzold, 2000). A similar argument is that firms may plan strategic alliances with suppli-
ers, customers, or competitors operating in the same markets to try to reduce costs or to
alleviate competitive pressures. Since strategic alliances often necessitate mutual control,
19We initially implemented all regressions with another size variable, log sum of the market capitaliza-
tion of the two firms in a dyad, but excluded it because it was never significant.
20The time in the CAC 40 is divided by the number of years the firm is present in the sample, for each
firm in the dyad.
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this may generate intra-industry interlocks. Therefore, the probability of interlocking
directorates should be higher if firms belong to the same industry sector. To account
for these alliance-related interlocks we create two dummy variables DU_IDEMSIC and
DU_FIN2: the first is equal to 1 if the two firms in the dyad are non-financial firms
belonging to the same 2-digit SIC industrial sector; the second is equal to 1 if the two
firms are financial companies. Firms also want to secure bank funding at the best possible
price. Again, this may produce interlocks because banks send directors to large debtors
to reduce problems of asymmetric information, and large borrowers try to be represented
on banks’ boards to obtain better financing conditions.21 However, this may also prevent
interlocks because banks are aware of monitoring costs and potential conflicts of interests
and do not want to become captive monitors (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). We assess
this effect with the dummy DU_FIN1 which is equal to 1 when only one of the two firms
is a financial company.22
We also need to address the specificity of CEO interlocks. First, there is evidence that
CEOs are particularly eager to sit on each other’s boards because it provides job security
and higher compensation (see e.g., Hallock, 1997; Fich and White, 2005; Kramarz and
Thesmar, 2006; Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010). It might be suspected that our
results for all interlocks are driven by CEOs interlocks. To check this, we re-run all the
regressions with modified dependent variables, excluding CEO interlocks from the count
of interlocking directorates (see “Robustness check 1” in next section). While managers’
entrenchment strategies may produce CEO interlocks, they do not necessarily favor the
21E.g. evidence is provided by Morck and Nakamura (1999), Byrd and Mizruchi (2005), Santos and
Rumble (2006), Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008), Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2010), and
Ferreira and Matos (2012).
22Note that insurance companies are included in the category “financial companies” because, like in
Germany, they are important providers of equity for French corporations and this may generate overlap-
ping directors.
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formation of interlocks between non-CEO directors: managers may prefer a degree of
closure of the firm’s governance system to avoid the introduction of external directors
that could challenge their decisions. If so, then the more powerful the CEO in the firm
the less likely will be the nomination of outside directors from shareholder companies keen
to monitor his or her actions. Therefore, we can expect a negative correlation between
measures of boards’ closure and the probability of interlocking directorates. We introduce
two variables to address two dimensions of this problem. The first is a measure for board
independence DU_NODUALITY which is equal to 1 if both firms have a rule that the
CEO cannot be the chairman of the board.23 We expect a positive effect on interlocks
probabilities. The second measures average ownership concentration of the two firms in the
dyad, C1MEAN, which is equal to the average voting rights held by the main shareholder
in the two companies (Table 2 Panel A provides the distribution of CAC 40 companies
according to the percentage of VR held by the first owner). The existence of controlling
shareowners should have a negative impact on interlock probabilities because such large
blockholders will not easily accept sharing of power with other firms; consequently they
will prefer directors that represent only their interests, rather than interlocked directors
that may represent the interests of other firms.
3 Econometric method and results
The main dependent variable, INTERLOCKS, is a dyadic categorical variable equal to
0 if there is no interlock between the two firms in the dyad, equal to 1 if there is one
interlocked director, and equal to 2 if there are at least two interlocks between the firms.
23We also built a count variable equal to zero if the chairman is the CEO in both firms, equal to 1 if
the CEO is not the chairman in one firm in the dyad, and equal to 2 if DU_NODUALITY equals 1. The
results were unchanged when using this variable.
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It is natural to use multinomial logit models in this context. The panel structure of our
dataset allows us to account for time dependence; in all the regressions we introduce
the nine time dummies corresponding to our 1997-2006 observation period. The panel
structure also may generate autocorrelation within each firm dyad, and heteroskedastic-
ity between dyads; we systematically adjust standard errors for clustering at dyad level
with the Huber-White correction. There is also a specific autocorrelation issue generated
by the dyadic nature of the dependent variable: considering that we have n firms and
n× (n− 1)/2 dyads, errors are autocorrelated between dyads because any firm i present
in dyad ij is also present in the n − 1 other possible dyads that include firm i. As a
consequence, any unobserved characteristic of firm i that would fall into the error term
εij could also be present in the errors εik(k = 1 . . . (n − 1); k 6= j) related to firm i. The
simplest way to address this problem is inspired by gravity models of foreign trade flows
(see, e.g., Mátyás, 1997) and consists of introducing weights variables measuring the grav-
ity of each firm in each dyad (see, e.g., Hoekman, Frenken, and Tijssen, 2010, who apply
the same methodology to scientific collaboration networks). The already described vari-
ables DEGREEit and DEGREEjt which control for reputation effect provide the required
gravity measures. We introduce time averaged degrees, AVDEGREEi and AVDEGREEj
as firm fixed effects. Since the model includes a distance measure as well (the variable
DISTANCETOCAC described above), it is rather similar to a gravity model.
Table 4 displays the results – odd ratios and standard errors – of the multinomial
logit regressions of the categorical variable INTERLOCKS on ownership and the control
variables described above. The Log Pseudolikelihood and other usual statistics not dis-
played here show that the overall fit of the model is very satisfactory. The Small-Hsiao
tests validate the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives. All regressions
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are implemented for the period 1997-2006 on 1,776 firm dyads, resulting in an unbalanced
panel of 12,611 dyad-year observations.
The odds of having one interlocking directorates rather than zero, and at least two
interlocking directorates rather than zero, are strongly and positively affected by the three
forms of ownership linkages. For example, if one of the two dyad firms holds at least 20%
of the shares of the other firm, the odds of having one interlock rather than zero are
multiplied by 10.92 and the odds of having two or more interlocks change by a factor of
92.09. The factor change coefficients of the ownership variables DU_UNIL, DU_CROSS,
DU_UNIL_SUP, and DU_UNIL_INF are much larger than the coefficients of the other
significant variables. These results unambiguously validate Proposition 1, point i): inter-
locking directorates are strongly correlated to ownership linkages, which can be interpreted
as evidence that ownership ties are used to produce monitoring or control linkages. As
already discussed, this result counters the view that control is separated from ownership.
On this sample of firms, stock owners seem to be able to achieve nominations of directors
that will represent their interests. We see that the other corollaries of proposition 1 are
also validated by these regressions: the variable DU_UNIL_INF is significant in all cases,
showing that even small shareholdings very much increase the odds of having interlocks
(point ii, proposition 1).24 Also, even if the percentage of shareholdings between the firms
in the dyad is very small (Table 4 columns 9 to 12), the coefficients of factor change are
more important than the other significant variables. However, as stated in Proposition
1 point iii), the higher the shareholding, the higher should be the odds of having one or
more interlocks. Indeed, the Wald tests displayed under Table 4 (note (5) “UNIL ≥ α
24If we use VR instead of CFR, DU_UNIL_INF no longer explains the existence of one interlock for
the 1% threshold. It suggests that some small shareholders benefit from double voting which allows them
to have more than 1% of the VR. Shareholdings below the 1% cut-off of CFR but without double voting
are not a determinant of single interlocks but still explain multiple interlocks.
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vs. UNIL < α”) show that, for all outcomes and all ownership thresholds except the 1%
limit, the coefficients of the dummy measuring large blockholdings are always significantly
greater than the coefficients of the dummy measuring small blockholdings. Here again,
ownership appears to be an important determinant of monitoring or control ties, and the
higher the ownership linkage the higher the ability to affect the course of action of a firm.
Please insert Table 4
Proposition 2, point i) states that the correlation between multiple interlocks and
ownership ties can be interpreted as evidence that some shareowners seek control power
rather than simple monitoring capacity. Our results support this proposition: indeed,
the odds of having at least two rather than zero interlocks increase by a factor 11.89
when two firms have a unilateral ownership linkage. Moreover, the theory predicts that
decision-making authority might be sought by both large and small blockholders. If these
shareholders have a real incentive to seek such control power, then multiple interlocks are
likely to be even more strongly correlated to ownership linkages than single interlocks,
which latter reveal either a monitoring power or control power (Proposition 2, point ii).
The Wald tests (notes (3), (4), (6) and (7) to Table 4) provide clear evidence supporting
this proposition: all ownership linkage variables tested affect the odds of having multiple
interlocks more than the odds ratios of having a single interlock, and according to the
Wald Chi2 statistics, these differences are always significant. Finally, Proposition 2, point
iii) states that control power depends more strongly on ownership lock-in devices than
on unilateral ownership linkages. The discrepancy between VR and CFR cannot validate
this proposition because as already underlined, the results are the same with both types
of measures. Nevertheless, Table 4 shows that cross-ownership has a higher impact on
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the odds of having multiple interlocking directorates, than a unilateral stake. Indeed,
this specific corporate ownership lock-in device changes the odds of having at least two
interlocks by a factor of 85.34 and unreciprocated ownership changes the odds by a factor
11.89. The Wald test (note (4) to Table 4) shows that this difference is significant. More-
over, notice that the difference between unilateral and cross-ownership is not significantly
different from zero in the case of a single interlock. Therefore, cross-ownership seems to
have a particular influence on multiple overlapping directors reflecting the control purpose
of this ownership lock-in device.
Before commenting on the control variables, it is also useful to notice that common
ownership by a third party, measured by the variables IDEMOWNER and DU_STATE,
has a much lower effect on board interlocking between a pair of firms than the existence
of unilateral or cross-ownership linkages between them.
In relation to the control variables, the factor change coefficients are in line with what
is predicted in the literature. First, even after controlling for board size,25 our measures of
board reputation and competence (DEGREEit and DEGREEjt) display coefficients that
are significant and greater than 1 factor change. Similarly, the inverted measure of simi-
larity between pairs of firms (DISTANCETOCAC) has the expected significant and less
than 1 factor change coefficient. The dummy DU_FIN1 (equal to 1 if one and only one
of the two firms is a financial company) has a significant and less than 1 factor change
coefficient, which means that pairs of financial and non-financial companies have fewer
interlocking directorates than pairs of non-financial companies belonging to different sec-
25Note that BOARDSIZE, which is a natural control variable for interlocking directorates, is significant
only if the companies have one overlapping director. This effect disappears if the dyad has at least two
interlocks. In other words, controlling ties between corporations must be explained by other factors than
the natural determinant of interlocking directorates. The effect of BOARDSIZE is significantly different
from zero for at least two interlocks only when we remove the board reputation variables DEGREEit and
DEGREEjt.
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tors: in line with the argument in Kroszner and Strahan (2001), financial companies seem
to avoid interlocking directorates with potential customers because they want to avoid
potential conflicts of interests. The idea that industry alliances will generate interlocks
is not supported in this sample: we find non-significant factor change coefficients for the
dummy DUIDEMSIC designed to detect alliances between two non-financial firms; the
dummy DU_FIN2 constructed to detect alliances between financial firms, shows signif-
icantly reduced odds ratios but only for the multiple interlock outcome. Finally, our
measures of board openness (C1MEAN and DU_NODUALITY) are not significant.
4 Robustness checks
We next address several potential shortcomings of the above estimates: 1) the results
may be driven by CEO interlocks, and therefore may reflect a managerial entrenchment
strategy rather than the possibility for the corporate owner to have directors who will
act on its behalf; 2) measures of direct ownership linkages may not capture correctly the
reality of ownership connections; 3) the causality between ownership linkages and human
linkages (interlocks) may be inverted.
4.1 Robustness check 1: Are the results driven by CEO inter-
locks?
Although our measures of board openness (DU_NODUALITY and C1MEAN) do not
have significant effects on the odds of having interlocked directors, which suggests that
managerial entrenchment is not driving the results, we check whether removing CEO
interlocks changes the findings.
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The regressions in Table 5 are similar to the above regressions, except the multino-
mial dependent variable is now constructed excluding CEO interlocks.26 Nothing changes
concerning propositions 1 and 2, points i) and ii). However, in relation to Proposition 2,
point iii) the factor change coefficients of the variable DU_CROSS_CFR1 are no longer
significant, which means that the positive impact of cross-shareholdings on interlocking
directorates was driven by CEO interlocks. This modification can be interpreted in two
ways: 1) either managers use cross-ownership as a means of obtaining a position on each
other’s boards for entrenchment purpose; or 2) they promote cross-shareholdings when
they sit on each other’s boards. However, this finding does not challenge proposition 1 or
proposition 2, points i) and ii): ownership is required to obtain control – even to control
the firm at the expenses of other shareholders.
Please insert Table 5
4.2 Robustness check 2: varying the measures of ownership link-
ages
In the results presented in Tables 4 and 5, ownership connections are measured on the
basis of direct CFR figures. However, pyramid structures27 and cross-shareholdings mean
that some ultimate owners have the possibility of a seat on the board even when the
value of their indirect CFR is lower than the value of the direct CFR. Indeed, multiple
26The count variable INTERLOCKS takes the value zero if CEOs sit on each other’s boards.
27In Faccio and Lang’s (2002) study, in 15.7% of cases, French firms with a 20% controlling shareholder
are controlled by a pyramid structure. In our data, this frequency is 22.5% of firms with a 20% controlling
owner. When the first shareowner holds at least 10% or 5% of the VR, there is a pyramid structure in
respectively 21.2% and 26.6% of cases. The frequency rises to 30.8% of our year-firm sample if we consider
all first shareowners even if they hold less than 5% of the VR. Consequently, the use of a pyramid by
the first shareholder seems to increase with ownership dispersion, suggesting that this structure plays an
important role for various capital thresholds of main French corporations.
28
indirect owners may be eligible for board membership either because they ultimately
control a direct shareholding or because they contribute to pyramid structure used to
control it. Consequently, accounting for these indirect owners may change the correlation
between ownership connections and board interlocks. We utilize the information on parent
companies and group subsidiaries provided in annual reports and the Dafsaliens database
to investigate ownership chains and compute indirect CFR. Before presenting the method,
we highlight two points. First, we apply this approach not to VR but to CFR, that is we
apply a linear not a threshold methodology (Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston, 2011). The
reason for this choice is that indirect VR provide effective control rights only when the
indirect owner holds more than 50% of the VR for each link in the ownership chain (or 20%
or 10% depending on control chain definition). It is only in this case that we can consider
that the indirect owner controls the votes of the direct owner. Using VR would imply
that we could only select the controlling owner of the direct shareholding whereas we are
interested in all indirect owners. Conversely, indirect owners can be tracked by computing
indirect CFR which is a non-exclusive method because it produces a non-zero value for an
indirect owner even if he is not the controlling owner. Second, while ultimate controlling
owners were identified for each shareholding, they cannot be included in the regressions if
the companies were not listed on the CAC 40 over the 1997-2006 observation period. The
reason for this selection is the dyadic approach employed here: the ownership connections
matrix and the interlocking directorates’ matrix have to be of same size and composed of
the same firms. Nevertheless, we investigate the entire ultimate ownership structure of
the corporations in the sample to detect all possible indirect shareholdings across these
companies. Thus, for the whole period we collect 3,174 shareholdings across a total of 249
entities including the 61 corporations we investigate in this paper. This number (listed
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or unlisted companies and ultimate family owners) varies from a minimum of 142 to a
maximum of 188 depending on the year considered. The number of shareholdings across
these entities ranges from a minimum of 257 to a maximum of 357.
Exploiting this set of ties and entities, for each year we compute a matrix Y of direct
and indirect CFR according to the formula28:
Y = ∑∞α=1Xα = (In −X)−1X,
where X = (xi,j)1≤i,j≤n; xi,j is the percentage of direct CFR held by i over j; 0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ ∑ni=1 xi,j ≤ 1. α is the number of links considered in the ownership chain and
In is the unit matrix of size n = (min = 142;max = 188). This formula generates more
than 2000 direct and indirect shareholdings between corporations belonging to the CAC
40 index. Nevertheless, we consider indirect ownership ties only if they bring at least
0.25% of the CFR, which is equivalent to an ownership chain with two links of 5%. As
a result of this inclusion of indirect ownership ties between the sample firms, the number
of unilateral ties increases from 560 to 714, and the number of cross-shareholdings rises
from 63 to 84.
We then re-estimate the multinomial logit equations, replacing the indepen-
dent variables DU_UNIL_CFR1, DU_CROSS_CFR1, DU_UNIL_SUP_CFR1,
DU_UNIL_INF_CFR1 by DU_UNIL_CFR2, DU_CROSS_CRF2,
28Another possible approach is to exclude direct participations when the indirect owners of the direct
owners benefit from the integrality of the CFR of the latter. In this case, the ownership ties matrix is :
Z = DY,
where D = diag(U−S), U is the unit row vector and S = (sj)1≤j≤n is a row vector whose elements are:
sj =
∑n
i=1 xi,j .
However we did not adopt this approach because it suppresses direct ownership connections which are
shown to be effective determinants of board interlocks. Similar methodologies are used and discussed in,
e.g., Brioschi, Buzzacchi, and Colombo (1989), Flath (1989), Dietzenbacher, Smid, and Volkerink (2000),
Dietzenbacher and Temurshoev (2008), Chapelle and Szafarz (2005), Gutiérrez, Pombo, and Taborda
(2008), Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston (2011), Almeida, Park, Subrahmanyam, and Wolfenzon (2011).
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DU_UNIL_SUP_CRF2, DU_UNIL_INF_CRF2 computed with direct and indi-
rect CFR instead of direct CFR. The results are presented in Table 6.
Please insert Table 6
The significance of the odds ratios and Wald tests is not affected by this change. The
level of some odds ratios is slightly modified but not in a way that changes interpretation
of the results in relation to Propositions 1 and 2.
4.3 Robustness check 3: addressing the endogeneity of owner-
ship ties and board connections
The causality between ownership linkages and human linkages (interlocks) may be in-
verted because directors sitting on several boards may encourage companies to hold shares
in these firms. A simple and preliminary way to address this issue is to lag the own-
ership linkage variables in the regressions.29 We lag the variables DU_UNIL_CFR1,
DU_CROSS_CFR1, DU_UNIL_SUP_CFR1, DU_UNIL_INF_CFR1, IDEMOWNER
and DU_STATE by one year and three years. Since current interlocks cannot cause past
ownership linkages, if the latter have a significant impact on present interlocks this can
be interpreted as evidence that there is causality from ownership ties to board linkages,
even if the reverse causality is also present at time t.
The factor change coefficients of the ownership connection variables remain large and
significant even in the specifications with a three year lag. However, their level is some-
times reduced in comparison to the corresponding coefficients in Table 4. For example,
cross-shareholdings at year t raise the odds of having one board interlock at year t by a
29These regressions, not displayed here for space reasons, are available upon request.
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factor 5.7 (Table 4) whereas a cross-ownership at year t− 1 increases the odds of having
one interlock at year t by a factor of only 4.3, and by a factor 3.2 if the variable is three
year lagged. Therefore, even if past ownership ties increase the odds of interlocks, sug-
gesting that at least part of the causality goes from ownership ties to board interlocks, we
cannot exclude that the larger contemporaneous correlation is due to a partial inversion
of contemporaneous causality.
Since we cannot exclude that causality inversion may be biasing the results, we inves-
tigate this issue further using instrumented versions of our multinomial logit regressions.
Two instrumental variables techniques can be implemented to correct for endogeneity
biases in nonlinear models: the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method and the two-
stage predictor substitution (2SPS) approach. Both methods use consistent first stage
regressions to instrument the variables that are supposed to be endogenous. In 2SPS, the
results of the first stage regressions are used to generate predicted values for the endoge-
nous variables. The second-stage regression is conducted after replacing the endogenous
variables by their predicted values. In 2SRI, the endogenous variables are not replaced in
the second-stage regression. Instead, the first-stage residuals are included as additional
regressors. If their coefficients are significant, endogeneity is confirmed. This method was
suggested by Hausman (1978) to test for endogeneity in linear models. Consistent 2SRI
methods for various types of non-linear models were proposed by Smith and Blundell
(1986), Newey (1987), Rivers and Vuong (1988), and Blundell and Smith (1989, 1993).
Wooldridge (2008) suggests the use of the 2SRI method for count data models. Terza,
Basu, and Rathouz (2008) show that, in contrast to the 2SPS estimator, the 2SRI estima-
tor is consistent for non-linear models such as, for example, the multinomial logit we use
in this paper. The use of 2SPS can generate substantial bias and this is not attenuated
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by large sample sizes. Thus, there are strong arguments favoring the use of 2SRI for the
econometric estimation of nonlinear models with endogenous regressors.
We suspect that cross-shareholdings (DU_CROSS_CFR1) and large and small share-
holdings (DU_UNIL_SUPα_CFR1 and DU_UNIL_INFα_CFR1) at various holdings
thresholds α% may be endogenous because directors sitting on several boards promote
cross-ownership between, or unilateral ownership in, the multiple firms of which they are
directors. Since we do not possess external instruments for these possibly endogenous
variables we use internal ones. Lagging and differentiating some of the independent vari-
ables generates an important decrease in the number of observations and, even if their
number remains large (> 7, 000), this is problematic because of the categorical nature
of the dependent and independent variables. Indeed, INTERLOCKS is equal to 0 in
90% of the 12,611 observations, DU_CROSS_CFR1 is equal to 1 in only 0.5 % of cases,
DU_UNIL_SUP5%_CFR1 is equal to 1 in 1% of cases, and DU_UNIL_SUP20%_CFR1
is equal to 1 in 0.5% of cases. As a consequence, the loss of too many observations gen-
erates situations in which some independent dummy variables do not vary within the
dependent variable categories, which implies that their coefficients cannot be estimated.
This problem forces us to limit the number of instrumented variables, and also to limit
the number of lags used to instrument these variables.
Therefore, we adopt the following strategy. First, we address endogeneity in the sim-
plest specification of our model including only DU_UNIL_CFR1 and DU_CROSS_CFR1
because unilateral ownership captured by DU_UNIL_CFR1 is not differentiated between
large and small shareholdings. Only one variable, DU_CROSS_CFR1, is suspected of
endogeneity in this equation. We implement the 2SRI method to re-estimate this equa-
tion and show that the endogeneity test rejects the hypothesis that DU_CROSS_CFR1
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is endogenous. We can now implement the 2SRI estimation in the other equations where
DU_UNIL_CFR1 is split into two categories for large and small shareholdings. Of course,
“large” stakes have to be defined according to the various thresholds already utilized: 20%,
10%, 5%, 2%, and 1%. However, it was not possible to find tractable instruments in the
case of the 20% threshold because the variable DU_UNIL_SUP20_CFR1 is too infre-
quently equal to 1 (0.5% of cases). The need for a large enough number of cases where the
independent dummy variable suspected of endogeneity is equal to 1 led us to implement
the 2SRI method, with the unilateral ownership threshold set at 5% only, for the variables
DU_UNIL_SUP5_CFR1 and DU_UNIL_INF5_CFR1 as potentially endogenous, and
all the other independent variables, including DU_CROSS_CFR1, as exogenous.
Table 7 shows the outcomes of the 2SRI re-estimation of the first interlock equa-
tion of Table 4, with the variables DU_CROSS_CFR1 considered potentially endoge-
nous. The first stage equation is a simple logit model (with standard errors adjusted for
clustering) where DU_CROSS_CFR1 is regressed on the independent variables in the
main equation plus two instruments:30 DIFFCROSS_CFR1t−1 (= CROSS_CFR1t−2−
CROSS_CFR1t−1), which is the one year lagged first difference of the average percentage
of the CFR of the cross-shareholdings of the two firms in the dyad, and CROSS_CFR1t−3,
which is the average of the CFR of the two firms when they have cross-shareholdings, three
year lagged. The coefficients of these instruments are both highly significant, showing that
they are not weak instruments. We then compute the residuals of this regression and add
them into the multinomial logit equation already presented. Note however that, in this
second stage equation, the standard errors have to be adjusted to account for the fact
that the residuals included come from a first stage estimation. We obtain consistent
30We had to exclude DU_UNIL_CFR1 because of perfect prediction by construction, and we dropped
DU_IDEMSIC because it does not vary when DU_CROSS_CFR1= 1.
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standard errors for this second stage equation via bootstrapping (100 replications). More-
over, we implement an over-identifying restrictions test that consists simply of adding
the instruments as explanatory variables in the second stage equation and testing their
joint significance. This test validates the instruments that appear to be uncorrelated
with the dependent variable INTERLOCKS. The residuals from the first stage regression
are not significant, which suggests rejecting the hypothesis that DU_CROSS_CFR1 is
endogenous.
Please insert Table 7
Therefore, we can treat the potential endogeneity of DU_UNIL_SUP5_CFR1 and
DU_UNIL_INF5_CFR1 without instrumenting the variable DU_CROSS_CFR1.
Table 8 shows the result obtained using two first-stage equations to instrument
DU_UNIL_SUP5_CFR1 and DU_UNIL_INF5_CFR1. We introduce the two residuals
from these first-stage equations in the second stage multinomial logit regression, again
with bootstrapped residuals. The first stage equations shows that our instruments31 are
not weak, and the over-identifying restrictions test implemented in the second stage re-
gressions shows that they are also valid instruments. Again, the residuals from the two
first stage regressions are not significant, which suggests rejecting the hypothesis that
DU_UNIL_SUP5_CFR1 and DU_UNIL_INF5_CFR1 are endogenous.
Please insert Table 8
We can conclude that the specifications in Table 4 for which we could implement the
2SRI method are not biased by an endogeneity problem. However, we do acknowledge
31The four instruments are DIFFUNIL_SUP_CFR1t−1 (=UNIL_SUP_CFR1t−2−
UNIL_SUP_CFR1t−1), UNIL_SUP_CFR1t−3, DIFFUNIL_INF_CFR1t−1 (=UNIL_INF_CFR1t−2−
UNIL_INF_CFR1t−1), and UNIL_SUP_CFR1t−3. By construction, DU_CROSS_CFR1 is removed
from the first stage equations.
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that the large number of observations required to implement this technique with internal
instruments and bootstrapped residuals does not allow us to implement the test in the
specifications with the largest ownership thresholds (more than 10% or 20% of shares).
In summary, this series of robustness tests provides convincing supplementary evidence
regarding propositions 1 and 2: varying ownership measures, removing CEOs interlocks,
or addressing potential endogeneity problems does not change our conclusions. However,
proposition 2 point iii) is invalidated by the exclusion of CEO interlocks from the depen-
dent variable: the strong correlation between cross-ownership ties and board interlocks
is driven by CEO interlocks, which can be interpreted as evidence of a managerial en-
trenchment strategy. CEOs use cross-shareholdings as a means of obtaining a seat on
each other’s boards for entrenchment purposes, and as demonstrated by the instrumental
variables approach, the causality goes from cross-ownership to CEO interlocks and not in
the reverse direction.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to provide empirical evidence on the non-separation of owner-
ship and control for a wide range of large and small blockholdings held by corporations,
which are typical shareowners in insider governance systems. We adopted the definition
of control in the existing analytical work (Tirole, 2006): control rights are decision rights
since they provide their holder the ability to affect the course of action of the firm. Ac-
cording to the seminal empirical work by Berle and Means (1932), obtaining one or more
seats on the board is the main way to achieve control rights in corporations. Our empirical
strategy is original because it evaluates the ability of multiple categories of blockholders to
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be represented on the boards of their holdings, by measuring the correlation between two
networks: the network of overlapping directors between corporations, and the network of
shareholding linkages between the same set of companies.
By focusing on multiple categories of owners of a corporation, we contribute in three
ways to the literature dealing with minority controlling shareholders (Bebchuk and Weis-
bach, 2010). We show first that both large and small ownership linkages across companies,
from 20% to 1% of CFR or VR, are strong predictors of overlapping directors among these
corporations. The impact of ownership ties on interlocking directorates is much stronger
than any of the other potential determinants of overlapping directors, such as reputation
and competences of board members. This result is congruent with studies on control-
ling shareholders because we show that the probability that two firms are interlocked is
increased more if one of them holds a large stake in the other than if it holds a small
stake. Nevertheless, since we also find that small shareholdings can create interlocking
directorates, our work underlines the need to consider not only the first or the second
shareholder but also the entire ownership structure, particularly when it involves other
listed companies. A second important contribution is that we distinguish between the two
possible goals of shareholders when they want a seat on the board: a) they may want to
monitor the firm, which requires ability to gather information that can be enabled by a
single seat on the board; b) they may want control power, that is, real making-decision
authority which can be achieved only by a strong position on the board. We interpret mul-
tiple interlocks between two companies as a signal that at least one of the two connected
corporations seeks decision-making authority rather than simple monitoring ability. We
show that large and small shareholdings are even more strongly correlated with multiple
than single interlocks, which suggests that the control purpose depends more on owner-
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ship, than the monitoring purpose. The third main contribution of our study is that we
provide evidence that cross-ownership is a way for CEOs to entrench themselves. Indeed,
cross-shareholdings are the main determinant of multiple interlocking directorates but this
effect disappears when we remove CEO interlocks from the count of overlapping directors.
Finally, we show that our results are not biased by endogeneity problems which might
be due to causality issues: ownership linkages are the main determinant of interlocking
directorate, and not the reverse. Ownership remains the main way to gain monitoring or
controlling power even if this is at the expense of other minority shareholders in the case
of cross-ownership.
Beyond these methodological and empirical contributions, we think that our study pro-
vides recommendations for regulation of corporate governance in Europe. Transparency
has improved in European countries since the late 1990s (Enriques and Volpin, 2007).
Nevertheless, it remains difficult to gather systematic information on small shareholdings
below the 5% threshold of stock capital. We have demonstrated that small stakes held
by other corporations play an important role in corporate governance. In this study, we
matched five sources of information to collect reliable data on ownership structures. A
unified legally-based source of information that identifies all corporations that are minor-
ity shareholders of a given listed firm, is lacking in Europe. European countries, mainly
characterized by insider governance systems, could take inspiration from US regulation
which requires disclosure of all shareholdings held by large institutional owners. Our re-
sults suggest that similar regulation should be imposed in Europe to achieve disclosure
of all stakes held by large financial and non-financial listed companies. Of course, this
requires more research in the European context on the impact of ownership networks,
cross-holdings, and pyramidal ownership structures on corporate governance.
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Table 1: Annual frequency of corporations in the sample
Number of years in the
sample 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Total corp.
or dyad
Total
obs.
Number of corporations that
belong to the CAC 40 index at
least one quarter during 1997-2006
41 1 4 2 2 0 2 5 3 1 61 507
Number of dyads 820 41 170 89 94 4 96 235 159 68 1776 12611
Table 2: Evolution of ownership by corporation and by dyad
Years 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1997-2006
Total %
Panel A: % α of the voting rights ultimately owned by the first owner
Number of
corporations (n) 50 51 54 51 52 52 50 49 49 49 507 100
α ≥ 50% 14 16 16 11 12 11 10 8 8 9 115 22.68
20% ≥ α < 50% 14 13 17 16 16 16 13 16 16 15 152 29.98
10% ≥ α < 20% 10 11 10 11 10 10 11 10 9 11 103 20.32
5% ≥ α < 10% 9 8 6 9 10 9 12 10 10 9 92 18.15
α < 5% 3 3 5 4 4 6 4 5 6 5 45 8.88
Panel B: Evolution of main dyadic variables
Number of dyads
(n× (n− 1)/2) 1225 1275 1431 1275 1326 1326 1225 1176 1176 1176 12611 100
Number of interlocking directorates (in % of dyads in italic)
1 interlock 178 191 214 198 175 171 158 157 152 131 1725 13.68
14.53 14.98 14.95 15.53 13.20 12.90 12.90 13.35 12.93 11.14
At least 2 interlocks 77 59 60 56 43 37 35 32 25 26 450 3.57
6.29 4.63 4.19 4.39 3.24 2.79 2.86 2.72 2.13 2.21
Number of ownership ties (in % of dyads in italic)
Unilateral ownership 60 57 67 58 68 60 58 54 47 31 560 4.44
4.90 4.47 4.68 4.55 5.13 4.52 4.73 4.59 4.00 2.64
Cross-ownership 17 14 8 8 3 3 3 3 2 2 63 0.50
1.39 1.10 0.56 0.63 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.17 0.17
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
INTERLOCKS overall 0.208 0.486 0 2
between 0.418 0 2
within 0.281 -1.292 1.986
DU_INTERLOCK1 overall 0.137 0.344 0 1
between 0.262 0 1
within 0.238 -0.763 1.037
DU_INTERLOCK_MIN2 overall 0.036 0.186 0 1
between 0.155 0 1
within 0.120 -0.764 0.936
DU_UNIL_CFR1 overall 0.044 0.206 0 1
between 0.178 0 1
within 0.117 -0.856 0.944
DU_CROSS_CFR1 overall 0.005 0.071 0 1
between 0.055 0 1
within 0.047 -0.895 0.905
DU_UNIL_CFR2 overall 0.057 0.231 0 1
between 0.198 0 1
within 0.137 -0.843 0.957
DU_CROSS_CFR2 overall 0.007 0.081 0 1
between 0.066 0 1
within 0.050 -0.893 0.907
DU_UNIL_SUP20_CFR1 overall 0.004 0.066 0 1
between 0.065 0 1
within 0.039 -0.896 0.893
DU_UNIL_INF20_CFR1 overall 0.040 0.196 0 1
between 0.165 0 1
within 0.114 -0.860 0.940
DU_UNIL_SUP5_CFR1 overall 0.008 0.091 0 1
between 0.092 0 1
within 0.049 -0.892 0.908
DU_UNIL_INF5_CFR1 overall 0.036 0.186 0 1
between 0.153 0 1
within 0.111 -0.864 0.936
DU_UNIL_SUP1_CFR1 overall 0.036 0.186 0 1
between 0.163 0 1
within 0.110 -0.864 0.936
DU_UNIL_INF1_CFR1 overall 0.008 0.091 0 1
between 0.058 0 1
within 0.067 -0.692 0.908
IDEMOWNER overall 0.223 0.503 0 5
between 0.409 0 5
within 0.344 -2.077 3.123
DU_STATE overall 0.191 0.393 0 1
between 0.276 0 1
within 0.268 -0.709 1.091
C1MEAN overall 28.969 16.424 0.670 95.910
between 15.893 3.137 91.213
within 7.766 -4.219 87.066
BOARDSIZE overall 26.889 5.110 9 45
between 4.605 13 40
within 2.558 14.889 39.889
DU_NODUALITY overall 0.114 0.318 0 1
between 0.241 0 1
within 0.212 -0.743 1.014
52
Table 3: Continued
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
DU_FIN1 overall 0.231 0.422 0 1
between 0.435 0 1
within 0 0.231 0.231
DU_FIN2 overall 0.015 0.121 0 1
between 0.137 0 1
within 0 0.015 0.015
DU_IDEMSIC overall 0.031 0.174 0 1
between 0.155 0 1
within 0.090 -0.869 0.931
DISTANCETOCAC overall 0.299 0.290 0 0.900
between 0.277 0 0.900
within 0 0.299 0.299
DEGREEit overall 11.200 8.145 0 48
between 7.420 0 48
within 4.239 -5 30.900
DEGREEjt overall 11.235 8.261 0 48
between 7.507 0 42
within 4.443 -8.598 30.935
AVDEGREEi overall 11.200 6.955 0 48
between 7.420 0 48
within 0 11.200 11.200
AVDEGREEj overall 11.235 6.964 0 42
between 7.507 0 42
within 0 11.235 11.235
Between statistics are calculated for an unbalanced panel of 1,776 dyads (pairs of firms i and j).
The average number of years a dyad is observed is 7.1. Overall and within statistics are calculated
over 12,611 dyad-year observations. “DU_” means that a variable is a dummy. INTERLOCKS is a
categorical variable ranging from 0 to 2. It is equal to 1 if DU_INTERLOCK1=1, and it is equal to 2
if DU_INTERLOCK_MIN2=1. DU_INTERLOCK1=1 if there is one overlapping director between
firms i and j, and DU_INTERLOCK_MIN2=1 if the dyad has at least two overlapping directors.
DU_UNIL_CFR1=1 if one of the two firms in the dyad directly holds a share of the stock capital of the
other firm. DU_UNIL_CFR2=1 if one of the two firms in the dyad directly or indirectly holds a share
of the cash-flow rights of the other firm. DU_CROSS_CFR1 (DU_CROSS_CFR2) is equal to 1 if
each firm in the dyad directly (or indirectly) holds a share of the other firm. DU_UNIL_SUPα_CFR1
(DU_UNIL_INFα_CFR1) is equal to 1 if one of the two firms in the dyad directly holds more
(less) than α% of the CFR of the other firm, where α can take the value of 20, 10, 5, 4, 3, 2, or
1. IDEMOWNER is equal to the number of common private-sector shareholders of the dyad, and
DU_STATE=1 if the French State holds shares in both dyad companies. C1MEAN is equal to the
average voting rights held by the first shareholder of the two companies. BOARDSIZE is equal to
the sum of the two board sizes of the dyad. DU_NODUALITY=1 if the two firms have adopted the
rule that the CEO cannot be the chairman of the board. DU_FIN1=1 if only one of the two firms
is a financial company. DU_FIN2=1 if the two firms are financial companies. DU_IDEMSIC=1 if
the two firms in the dyad are non-financial firms belonging to the same 2-digit SIC industrial sector.
DISTANCETOCAC is equal to the absolute value of the difference between the number of years that
firm i was in the CAC40 index over the sampling period minus the number of years that firm j was
in the CAC40 over the sampling period. Time in the CAC40 index is divided by number of years
that the firm was in the sample, for each firm in the dyad. DEGREEit is the number of outside
directorships held by firm i’s directors in other firms in the sample, and DEGREEjt is the number
of outside directorships held by firm j’s directors in other firms in the sample. AVDEGREEi and
AVDEGREEj are time averaged degrees.
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Table 7: Direct ownership ties and the odds of having interlocking directorates.
Endogeneity test 1
This table presents the results of the 2SRI endogeneity tests for multinomial logistic regressions. Observations are
pairs of firms i and j (dyads). The first stage equation is a logit model (with standard errors adjusted for clustering)
wherein DU_CROSS_CFR1 is regressed on the independent variables of the main equation plus two internal instruments:
DIFFCROSS_CFR1t − 1 (= CROSS_ CFR1t − 2− CROSS_ CFR1t − 1), which is the one year lagged first difference of the
average percentage of the cash-flow rights of the cross-shareholdings of the two firms of the dyad, and CROSS_CFR1t − 3,
which is the average of the cash-flow rights of the two firms when they have cross-shareholdings, 3-year lagged. Residuals of
the first stage equation are included in the second stage equation. The third model implements an over-identifying restric-
tions test that consists of adding the instruments as explanatory variables in the second stage equation and testing their
joint significance. The dependent variable in models (2) and (3) has three outcomes representing the number of interlocking
directorates between i and j: 0 (there is no interlock between i and j) is the base category; the other outcomes are 1
(firms i and j have one interlock) and 2 (firms i and j have at least 2 interlocks). “DU_” means that the variable is a
dummy. Each regression contains 6 dichotomous time variables (not displayed here). Coefficients β are replaced by factor
change coefficients (odds ratios), defined as exp(β). Robust standard errors of odds ratios (in parentheses) are adjusted for
clustering at dyad level. *, **, and *** indicate significance of the exponentiated coefficients at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Instrumentation Endogeneity Test Overidentification test
Dependent variable DU_CROSS_CFR1 INTERLOCKS INTERLOCKS
1 2 1 2
DIFFCROSS_CFR1t−1 24.306*** 1.262 1.201
(29.400) (0.955) (1.104)
CROSS_CFR1t−3 11.867*** 1.434 2.159
(6.955) (1.138) (1.976)
RESIDUALS 1.138 1.060 1.246 1.253
(0.355) (0.490) (0.882) (0.916)
DU_UNIL_CFR1 2.894*** 9.197*** 2.853*** 8.454***
(0.437) (2.232) (0.449) (2.192)
DU_CROSS_ CFR1 6.001 108.521*** 2.382 9.605
(6.590) (103.951) (7.162) (34.145)
IDEMOWNER 0.309 1.120* 1.265* 1.122* 1.247
(0.258) (0.075) (0.177) (0.076) (0.186)
DU_STATE 1.001 1.229** 1.245 1.226** 1.201
(0.891) (0.111) (0.315) (0.113) (0.299)
C1MEAN 0.960 1.003 1.007 1.003 1.007
(0.026) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)
BOARDSIZE 1.030 1.008 1.054** 1.008 1.055**
(0.073) (0.009) (0.024) (0.009) (0.024)
DU_NODUALITY 0.494 1.155 1.485 1.155 1.464
(1.023) (0.131) (0.405) (0.130) (0.414)
DU_FIN1 4.182* 0.691*** 0.301*** 0.691*** 0.316***
(3.379) (0.078) (0.072) (0.078) (0.078)
DU_FIN2 1.220 1.079 0.200** 1.062 0.186**
(2.735) (0.370) (0.141) (0.370) (0.128)
DU_IDEMSIC 0.767 2.222 0.767 2.288*
(0.169) (1.100) (0.171) (1.128)
DISTANCETOCAC 0.405 0.502*** 0.152*** 0.502*** 0.158***
(0.969) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.070)
DEGREEit 0.962 1.108*** 1.141*** 1.108*** 1.139***
(0.093) (0.010) (0.028) (0.010) (0.028)
DEGREEjt 0.956 1.078*** 1.173*** 1.079*** 1.173***
(0.099) (0.009) (0.027) (0.009) (0.027)
AVDEGREEi 1.024 0.979** 1.058** 0.979** 1.057**
(0.109) (0.010) (0.028) (0.010) (0.028)
AVDEGREEj 1.173** 1.003 1.007 1.002 1.004
(0.086) (0.008) (0.024) (0.008) (0.024)
Observations 7578 7578 7578
Number of clusters 1314 1314 1314
Log pseudolikelihood -47.711 -3313.185 -3309.606
1Small-Hsiao IIA test ok ok
WALD Tests
2UNIL vs. CROSS 0.45 6.81
pvalue 0.503 0.009
3UNIL: o1 vs. o2 18.56
pvalue 0.000
4CROSS: o1 vs. o2 9.25
pvalue 0.002
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Table 7: Continued
(1) (2) (3)
Instrumentation Endogeneity Test Overidentification test
Dependent variable DU_CROSS_CFR1 INTERLOCKS INTERLOCKS
1 2 1 2
5Chi2 joint test 1.20
pvalue 0.878
1 The Small-Hsiao test validates the IIA assumption in all cases.
2 Chi2 statistic for the hypothesis that the difference of the β coefficients of DU_UNIL_CFR1 and DU_CROSS_CFR1 is
zero.
3 Chi2 statistic for the hypothesis that the difference of the DU_UNIL_CFR1 β coefficients of outcome 1 and outcome 2
is zero.
4 Chi2 statistic for the hypothesis that the difference of the DU_CROSS_CFR1 β coefficients of outcome 1 and outcome
2 is zero.
5 Chi2 statistic for the hypothesis that the β coefficients of the instruments DIFFCROSS_CFR1t−1 and CROSS_CFR1t−3
are jointly different from zero.
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Table 8: Direct ownership ties and the odds of having interlocking directorates.
Endogeneity test 2
This table presents the results of the 2SRI endogeneity tests for multinomial logistic regressions. Observations are pairs
of firms i and j (dyads). The first stage equation (models 1 and 2) is a logit model (with standard errors adjusted for
clustering) where DU_UNIL_SUP5_CFR1 and DU_UNIL_INF5_CFR1 are regressed on the independent variables of the
main equation plus four internal instruments (3-year lagged value and 1-year lagged first difference value of the percentage
of the CFR of large and small shareholdings held by one of the two firms in the dyad). Residuals of the first stage equation
are included in the second stage equation (model 3). The fourth model implements an over-identifying restrictions test that
consists of adding the instruments as explanatory variables in the second stage equation and testing their joint significance.
The dependent variable in models (3) and (4) has three outcomes representing the number of interlocking directorates
between i and j: 0 (there is no interlock between i and j) is the base category; the other outcomes are 1 (firms i and j have
one interlock) and 2 (firms i and j have at least 2 interlocks). “DU_” means that the variable is a dummy. Each regression
includes 6 dichotomous time variables (not displayed here). Coefficients β are replaced by factor change coefficients (odds
ratios), defined as exp(β). Robust standard errors of odds ratios (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering at dyad level.
*, **, and *** indicate significance of the exponentiated coefficients at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Instrumentation Instrumentation Endogeneity Test Overidentification test
Dependent variable DU_UNIL_ DU_UNIL_ INTERLOCKS INTERLOCKS
SUP5_CFR1 INF5_CFR1 1 2 1 2
DIFFUNIL_SUP5_CFR1t−1 1.067** 1.078*** 0.983 1.047
(0.034) (0.019) (0.032) (0.072)
UNIL_SUP5_CFR1t−3 1.320*** 1.079*** 0.986 1.026
(0.064) (0.021) (0.029) (0.042)
DIFFUNIL_INF5_CFR1t−1 2.152*** 4.173*** 0.914 1.201
(0.555) (1.311) (0.156) (0.370)
UNIL_INF5_CFR1t−3 1.462 7.247*** 0.922 1.120
(0.512) (1.759) (0.133) (0.351)
RESIDUALS(1) 1.006 0.942 0.993 0.978
(0.054) (0.139) (0.193) (0.177)
RESIDUALS(2) 0.968 1.000 0.941 1.035
(0.045) (0.140) (0.059) (0.197)
DU_UNIL_SUP5_ CFR1 7.736*** 31.227*** 10.962* 16.860**
(3.283) (16.184) (13.531) (24.039)
DU_UNIL_INF_ CFR1 2.401*** 6.607*** 2.820*** 5.364**
(0.459) (2.710) (0.899) (3.872)
DU_CROSS_ CFR1 9.995*** 119.746*** 10.158*** 116.115***
(8.215) (93.296) (8.455) (93.185)
IDEMOWNER 1.643 1.254 1.117 1.255 1.116 1.251
(0.668) (0.256) (0.075) (0.174) (0.076) (0.177)
DU_STATE 1.719 1.106 1.226** 1.257 1.224** 1.264
(0.944) (0.282) (0.110) (0.320) (0.110) (0.326)
C1MEAN 1.052*** 0.958*** 1.003 1.006 1.003 1.005
(0.015) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)
BOARDSIZE 1.105*** 1.001 1.008 1.053** 1.008 1.056**
(0.041) (0.031) (0.009) (0.024) (0.009) (0.025)
DU_NODUALITY 0.937 0.547* 1.158 1.494 1.163 1.483
(0.661) (0.181) (0.130) (0.406) (0.130) (0.406)
DU_FIN1 0.869 34.975*** 0.717*** 0.343*** 0.712*** 0.355***
(0.541) (16.868) (0.082) (0.086) (0.082) (0.093)
DU_FIN2 4.164 41.766*** 1.097 0.227** 1.075 0.244**
(4.087) (30.481) (0.372) (0.153) (0.372) (0.160)
DU_IDEMSIC 4.190 2.593 0.736 2.011 0.731 2.105
(4.318) (2.619) (0.166) (1.072) (0.165) (1.134)
DISTANCETOCAC 1.254 0.360** 0.496*** 0.145*** 0.501*** 0.127***
(1.807) (0.177) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064)
DEGREEit 1.033 1.049 1.108*** 1.139*** 1.107*** 1.142***
(0.089) (0.032) (0.010) (0.028) (0.010) (0.029)
DEGREEjt 1.162*** 1.041 1.077*** 1.169*** 1.077*** 1.173***
(0.067) (0.027) (0.009) (0.027) (0.009) (0.027)
AVDEGREEi 1.016 0.949 0.978** 1.058** 0.978** 1.055*
(0.093) (0.032) (0.010) (0.029) (0.010) (0.029)
AVDEGREEj 0.984 1.009 1.002 1.010 1.003 1.007
(0.071) (0.029) (0.008) (0.024) (0.008) (0.024)
Observations 7578 7578 7578 7578
Number of clusters 1314 1314 1314 1314
Log pseudolikelihood -136.962 -500.218 -3306.603 -3303.339
1Small-Hsiao IIA test ok ok
WALD Tests
62
Table 8: Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Instrumentation Instrumentation Endogeneity Test Overidentification test
Dependent variable DU_UNIL_ DU_UNIL_ INTERLOCKS INTERLOCKS
SUP5_CFR1 INF5_CFR1 1 2 1 2
2UNIL ≥ 5% vs. UNIL < 5% 5.86 5.50
pvalue 0.016 0.019
3UNIL ≥ 5%: o1 vs. o2 6.75
pvalue 0.009
4UNIL < 5pvalue 0.017
5Chi2 joint test 2.72
pvalue 0.951
1 The Small-Hsiao test validates the IIA assumption in all cases.
2 Chi2 statistic for the hypothesis that the difference of the β coefficients of DU_UNIL_SUP5_CFR1 and
DU_UNIL_INF5_ CFR1 is zero.
3 Chi2 statistic for the hypothesis that the difference of the DU_UNIL_SUP5_ CFR1 β coefficients of outcome 1 and
outcome 2 is zero.
4 Chi2 statistic for the hypothesis that the difference of the DU_UNIL_INF5_ CFR1 β coefficients of outcome 1 and
outcome 2 is zero.
5 Chi2 statistic for the hypothesis that the β coefficients of the instruments DIFFUNIL_SUP5_CFR1t−1,
UNIL_SUP5_CFR1t−3, DIFFUNIL_INF5_CFR1t−1, and UNIL_INF5_CFR1t−3 are jointly different from zero.
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